Apps / TinyFish

TinyFish runs fleets of web agents. AgentID gives each one an account of its own

TinyFish runs enterprise fleets of web agents. AgentID lets each agent in the fleet hold its own account, so usage, keys, and accountability stay per agent.

TinyFish runs AI web agents for companies like Google, DoorDash, and ClassPass, and it now accepts Sign in with AgentID. An agent working on TinyFish can hold its own account, under its own verified identity, instead of running on a key a human pasted in.

In short

  • TinyFish is enterprise infrastructure for AI web agents: Search, Fetch, Browser, and Agent APIs behind a single key, with usage metered against a shared wallet.
  • At enterprise scale the caller is a fleet, and a fleet on one shared credential is unattributable by construction.
  • With Sign in with AgentID, an individual agent can establish its own account under its own verified identity.
  • Identity arrives over OpenID Connect: a stable identifier plus a working email address that belongs to the agent.
  • TinyFish keeps control of its APIs, wallet, metering, and policy at every stage.

What is TinyFish?

TinyFish is enterprise infrastructure for AI web agents, backed by a $47 million Series A led by ICONIQ. Behind one API it offers four capabilities: Search for structured results from live pages, Fetch for turning any URL into clean markdown or JSON, Browser for cloud sessions that hold up against bot detection, and Agent for multi-step web automation. TinyFish reports 89.9 percent on Mind2Web, the standard benchmark for web task automation.

Enterprises use it to automate the workflows that live on other people's websites: quoting, monitoring, inventory checks, market intelligence. So TinyFish's traffic is fleets of agents working around the clock, not a developer at a keyboard.

What breaks when a whole fleet runs on one credential?

Accountability breaks in both directions. A fleet behind one shared key looks like a single anonymous blob of usage. The platform cannot say which agent did what; the enterprise cannot cleanly answer where a given action came from when a workflow touches something it should not have; and one leaked credential is every agent's credential.

This matters more for TinyFish than for most platforms, because its agents act on the open web on real companies' behalf. The further an agent's actions reach, the more the question "which agent was that, exactly" needs a crisp answer, and a shared key guarantees it never has one.

The unit of accountability should be the agent, and that requires the agent to hold an account.

How does an agent in a fleet get its own account?

It signs in as itself. TinyFish accepts AgentID, AgentMail's sign-in service for AI agents, which runs on OpenID Connect, the same standard behind Sign in with Google. Each agent's identity is anchored to something it owns, its AgentMail inbox, and the sign-in delivers a verified email address and a stable identifier to TinyFish. The agent approves each sign-in with a single-use cryptographic signature from its own key. No password exists in the flow, and no human is needed to mint or distribute credentials.

At fleet scale the properties compound. Fifty agents hold fifty inboxes, so they arrive as fifty distinct, attributable account holders. Each returns to its own account on every sign-in because the identifier is stable. And each address is a working mailbox, so usage alerts, receipts, and account notices land with the account holder they concern, not in a shared inbox nobody owns.

Who controls what

StageAgentIDTinyFish
Identity at sign-inSupplies verified agent email and stable identifier through OpenID ConnectAccepts the sign-in, creates the account
API access and keysNot involvedIssues and scopes them per account
Wallet, metering, and billingNot involvedControls all three
What the agent may automateNot involvedGoverned by TinyFish's product and policy
Rate limits and abuse responseNot involvedEnforced per account, now attributably
Account emailProvides the inbox behind the identityDecides which messages it sends

What does per-agent identity buy an enterprise?

An audit trail that matches reality. When each agent is an account, usage reports say which agent consumed what, incident questions have a lookup instead of an investigation, and retiring one agent means closing one account rather than rotating a credential fifty processes depend on.

It also cleans up the security posture. No shared secret circulates through the fleet, and revoking one agent's sign-in credential touches exactly one agent. The blast radius of any single compromise shrinks to the account it happened in.

TinyFish, meanwhile, gains customers it can see. Fleet traffic stops being a blob and becomes accounts it can meter, limit, and reason about individually, with its own controls unchanged.

Start at TinyFish. The AgentID sign-in guide covers preparing an agent's inbox identity before its first sign-in.

FAQ

Questions, answered.

One account per agent, established by the agent's own verified identity. Shared credentials make fleet usage unattributable and turn every leak into a fleet-wide rotation. With AgentID each agent signs in as itself, so accounts, keys, and usage attach to individual agents, and fleet operations like retiring or quarantining one agent become single-account operations.

It removes it. The alternative is a human minting, distributing, tracking, and rotating credentials across the fleet by hand. Sign-in makes account establishment part of each agent's own workflow: identity is anchored to the agent's inbox, the mapping from agent to account is a property of the system, and there is no credential spreadsheet to drift out of date.

A signed token carrying a stable identifier for the agent and its verified email address, delivered over OpenID Connect through a provider TinyFish chose to accept. TinyFish never receives a password or a reusable credential, because none exists in the flow. What the account may then do is entirely TinyFish's policy.

That agent's own credential and account, and nothing else. Sign-in keys are scoped to the individual agent's identity, so revoking the compromised agent's key stops its sign-ins without touching the other agents. Compare that with a shared API key, where one compromise is everyone's incident.

No. It tells TinyFish which agent is at the door, stably, on every visit, and nothing about how it will behave. What the agent may automate, how much it may consume, and when it gets cut off remain TinyFish's controls, which per-agent identity makes precise rather than collective.

Prompt

Give yourself access to AgentMail
by following the guide at:

https://docs.agentmail.to/agent-onboarding

and refer to:

https://agentmail.to/llms.txt

for the documentation index.

Give your agent an identity of its own.

Create an AgentMail inbox and let your agent start signing in as a real user.